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There is much interest among economists and policy makers in the use of reverse auctions to 
purchase habitat conservation on private lands as a mechanism for minimizing public 
expenditures to achieve desired conservation outcomes. Examples are the Conservation Reserve 
Program (US) and Environmental Stewardship Scheme (UK). An important limitation of these 
auctions as implemented to date is that there is no explicit consideration of the spatial pattern of 
participation in the evaluation of bids. In this study we present the structure of a simple auction – 
the Agglomeration Vickrey Auction that implements a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The 
auction is designed to attain conservation goals through specific spatial patterns of land 
management while minimizing the total budgetary cost. We present the theoretical structure of 
the AVA and provide simple numerical examples to illustrate the effectiveness of the mechanism. 
We conclude with a section documenting the experiments that are to be conducted as a part of the 












 Section 1: Introduction: 
 
Habitat destruction is a major cause of species loss and the major threat to biodiversity (Knop et 
al., 2006, Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). In consequence, protection and restoration 
of habitat is a high priority for policy makers. When endangered species are located on publicly 
owned lands, the protection measures are under the direct purview of the government. But it is 
often the case that essential habitats are located on private lands. The US General Accounting 
Office reported in 1995 that 90% of all species listed as endangered in the United States are 
located on private lands. One of the most widely used instruments to influence land use decisions 
to manage habitat located on such lands are reverse auctions. Conservation or land auctions as 
these reverse auctions are often called have been implemented through the operation of incentive 
schemes like the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the US and Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme in the UK, to name a few. Since 1985 when the CRP was introduced, nearly 36.8 million 
acres of farmland has been enrolled, 1.8 million acres of wetlands have been restored and erosion 
of about 450 million tons of soil has been prevented annually. Kirwan et al. (2005) present that 
the CRP has disbursed about $26 billion in payments to landowners.  
 
 Yet a key limitation of these auctions is that they don’t consider the issue of spatially contiguous 
land management. The ecological result of conservation actions that protect any particular patch 
of habitat in many cases however depends on which other areas are being protected, because of 
meta-population dynamics and community complementarity (Margules & Pressey 2000). Also the 
theory of bio-geography attaches considerable importance to the issue of spatial configuration of 
habitats (Wilson and Willis, 1975). For example large carnivores which have large home ranges 
are sensitive to fragmented habitats which include forests and the interface of forests and fields. 
These animals would thrive better in large and connected land areas. Fragmented reserves have 
considerable impacts on bird populations as most of them are either edge or interior species. 
Distances between forest fragments and smaller parcels of forest have also been shown to have a 
significant negative effect on number of species (Newark, 1991). Bockstael (1996) presents that it 
not just the total forested land in a region that matters for species abundance and diversity, but its 
size, shape and the conflicting land uses found along its edges. These factors indicate the 
importance of explicitly targeting spatially coordinated land management as a habitat 
management and biodiversity conservation policy.   
 Spatially explicit land auctions have been studied by Rolfe et al. (2005) and Reeson et al. (2008).  
The present research adds to this growing body of literature. Here, we first present an analysis of 
the performance of existing first-price sealed-bid scoring auctions in achieving spatially 
contiguous habitat management. We demonstrate that existing auctions will lead to desired 
outcomes when bids submitted are negatively correlated with total environmental benefits from 
parcel management and when land tracts generating high environmental benefits are situated 
adjacent to each other. In this situation existing auctions will choose the combination of parcels 
which provide high benefits at lower costs and will lead to desired spatial patterns. However 
when parcels generating high environmental benefits are not situated adjacent to each other and 
when greater environmental benefits can only come through management of high costs parcels, 
desired spatial configurations may not be attained. We present different numerical examples to 
support this claim. In order to solve the above problem, we present the structure of a new 
mechanism, the Agglomeration Vickrey Auction (AVA) that explicitly considers the ecological 
benefits from management of adjacent land tracts. The AVA implements a Vickrey-Clark-Groves 
(VCG) mechanism for spatially contiguous selection of bids. We then provide a simple numerical 
example to demonstrate the effectiveness of this new mechanism. This study is one of the very 
first to consider the application of a Vickrey auction to an environmental market setting and 
provides the theoretical foundation for an experimental study to establish the internal theoretical 
validity of the AVA. This is the subject of future research.  
 
The paper is arranged as follows. In Section 2, we provide a survey of the literature on auctions 
for habitat conservation and highlight the issues that have been presented in the context of 
spatially explicit conservation auctions. In section 3, we present the general theoretical setup for 
the two mechanisms. In section 4 we present various scenarios and analyses of the performance 
of scoring auctions in these scenarios. In section 5, we provide the structure of the AVA. Section 
6 focuses on the illustration of the performance of the AVA. Section 7 concludes with a 
description of the experimental research that is a part of future research.  
 
Section 2: Auctions for environmental conservation and management – a review of 
the literature 
 
In the presence of asymmetric information, reverse auctions have come to occupy a central 
position in economic literature on the allocation of land management contracts for habitat 
conservation (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 1997, Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann 
2007, Glebe 2008). The seminal work by Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) was the first to develop the theoretical foundations of bidding for risk neutral and risk averse agents in 
a hypothetical soil conservation auction. This study analysed simulated data from auctions 
involving maximization of landowner enrolment, and environmental objectives to reveal the cost 
effectiveness of auctions vis-à-vis fixed payment schemes. The same result has been found in 
other studies that use both theory and experimental data (Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann, 2007), 
and data from field trials (Stoneham et al. 2003, Windle and Rolfe 2008).  
 
A key feature of most studies on conservation auctions is their reliance on experimental 
economics methods to analyse the performance of both the auction institutions and the behaviour 
of participants. This is largely to assess how these instruments could potentially perform in an 
actual setting with real stakeholders. Key issues highlighted in these experimental studies include 
the design and performance of auctions in the presence of complementarities between different 
conservation projects (Said and Thoyer 2007), variation in auction performance on the basis of 
difference in the pricing rule employed in the auctions – uniform price or discriminatory price 
auctions (Cason and Gangadharan 2004, 2005), the extent to which information about policy 
objectives is to be revealed to the bidders (Cason et al. 2003, 2004) and the effectiveness of 
multiple auction rounds in improving auction efficiency (Hailu & Schilizzi 2004 and Schilizzi & 
Latacz-Lohmann 2007). 
 
Auctions for spatially coordinated land management: 
 
Of all the above studies, none of them have explicitly considered the issue of spatially contiguous 
habitat management. Research on this topic is limited to Rolfe et al. (2005) and Reeson et al. 
(2008). Both these studies, present experimental analyses of performance and bidding behavior in 
simple first price scoring auctions targeting creation of landscape corridors and linkages between 
core areas of habitat. The chief objective of these studies is to identify the different factors that 
encourage coordination and improve auction performance. In Rolfe et al. (2005) coordination is 
promoted by informing players about the corridor formation objective and permitting them to 
communicate. In Reeson et al. (2008) no communication is allowed but bidders are informed 
about the regulator’s spatial objective. Coordination is also facilitated by allowing players to 
interact in multiple rounds providing them the chance of revising the value or the location of the 
bids in the event of a mistake.
1  
                                                 
1 Such multi-round auctions have been considered in the context of reductions in non-point source pollution 
by Cason et al. (2003).  Analyses of bids from both these studies reveal that an auction is successful in revealing private 
cost information and incentivizing the creation of habitat corridors. However rent seeking is an 
issue. In Rolfe et al. (2005) rent seeking is mitigated in experimental sessions where bidders are 
not allowed to communicate. In Reeson et al. (2008) presence of unknown number of rounds and 
the inability to revise bids between rounds puts a check on rent seeking. However while the 
experimental research agenda provides valuable insight into the implementation of the auctions 
some theoretical issues still remain. First, none of these studies explicitly consider the impact of 
the relationship between the cost of management and environmental benefit of the parcel on the 
performance of the auction. Secondly, since these studies implement first-price sealed-bid 
auctions, truth telling is not a dominant strategy.  
 
Section 3: The general theoretical model 
 
In this section we provide the outline of the theoretical model and the assumptions that we make 
while analysing the performance of the conservation auctions.  
 
There are two kinds of agents in the economy – the social planner and the landowners. The set of 
landowners is denoted by F =1, 2, ....f and indexed by i. Each landowner has private information 
represented by type θi which is an element of the set  i Q . Let  ( ) f q q q q ,..... , 2 1 =  and  i iQ ´ = Q . 
The opportunity cost of land management for each property owner is determined by θ. 
 
Let x Î X be a vector of length f. X is the set of all possible combinations of f parcels which 
might be managed in the winning allocation. The i
th element of vector x takes a value of 1 or 0, 
depending upon whether the i
th owner is accepted into the management program or not. The set X 
consists of a total of (2
f − 1) elements. The social planner has a net benefit function represented 
by R X B ® : . This is a function of total environmental value generated from management V(x) 
– the sum of benefits from individual parcels in the allocation determined by x and sum of 





i t x V x B ) ( ) ( ) ( q                                    (1) 
Equation (1) however does not consider the environmental benefits from spatial contiguity. In 
order to quantify these spatial benefits we define a  f × f matrix Ñ – the Contiguity Welfare 
Matrix. Each off-diagonal element of this matrix represents half the environmental benefit from shared borders across parcels. All diagonal elements  ii n  = 0 and all off-diagonal elements nij = nji 
"i, j. Diagonal elements of Ñ are zero as a parcel cannot be contiguous to itself so that there are 
no contiguity benefits from such. The situations where off-diagonal elements  ij n  = 0 are when the 
i
th and j
th properties are not contiguous to each other. 
 
The total environmental benefit from land management is a function both of the benefits from the 
parcels accepted into the program, represented by V (x) and the benefits from spatially contiguous 
habitat management that is represented in this study by the number of shared borders between 
management parcels and mathematically by the off diagonal elements of matrix Ñ. This is 
presented in a general form in (2) below. 
 
x N x x V x V
~
) ( ) ( ˆ ¢ + =                          (2) 
 
The expression  x N x
~ ¢  represents the environmental benefits from a particular spatial combination 
of parcels, x. In the case of the conventional scoring auctions,  O º N
~
, the null matrix. The total 
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On the side of the landowners, we assume that they have a utility function that is of the quasi-
linear form and represented by  R u i i ® q : . Let  ) ( 0 i q P  represent the returns from commercial 
activities on the land prior to program participation –  ) ( 0 i q P  is the reservation profit and b 
represents the submitted bid. Let  ) ( i c q P  represent the profit from commercial land use activities 
on private properties after accounting for the costs of habitat management on these properties. In 
order for the model to be tractable,  ) ( ) ( 0 i c i q q P > P . This implies that private participation in 
habitat conservation can only be incentivized through payments for the opportunity cost of 
change in land use given by  
 
) ( ) ( ) ( 0 i c i i c q q q P - P =   F iÎ "                                  (4) 
 The private benefits from land management for a landowner in the winning allocation is then 
represented by 
 
) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i c t u q q q - =   F iÎ "                                   (5) 
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We now represent the theoretical framework for bidding in a first price sealed bid scoring 
auction. For this we follow the optimization framework presented in Latacz-Lohmann and Van 
der Hamsvoort (1997). The presence of asymmetric information indicates that submitted bids are 
typically greater than the opportunity costs of land management by some amount dictated by the 
nature of expectations that landowners have about the bid caps as well as their opportunity costs 
of shifting to conservation land management. As in Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort 
(1997), we will assume that bidders’ expectations are uniformly distributed in the range[ ] b b,  
where b  represents the bid cap. In order to set up the theoretical background, we make a few 
other assumptions.  
 
Assumption 1: We assume that all farmers are risk neutral.  
 
Risk neutrality ensures that agents don’t submit bids which are lower than their opportunity costs 
of management to ensure a steady income stream during the time period of the contract. Given 
that risk neutral landowners maximize expected income from land management and have 
expectations about the bid caps that are uniformly distributed; the bids submitted take the form 
*
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i b                     (7) On the basis of the above bid function, we can evaluate the bidding behaviour and performance of 
a scoring auction for management of habitat on private properties. Since the scoring auctions are 
first price auctions, transfers obtained are equal to bid submitted. Thus (5) can also be written as  
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*
i c i i i i b u q q q q P - P - =   F iÎ "                                (8) 
 
 
Assumption 2: All landowners submit a single bid for management of land rather than multiple 
bids for various parcels on their properties.  
 
We make this simplifying assumption for two reasons. The first is that permitting multiple bid 
submissions may introduce combinatorial elements and complementarity into the auction. 
Conservation auctions with complementarities have been studied by Said and Thoyer (2007). 
However we don’t consider this setting here in order to reduce the computational complexity in 
bid selection. This complexity arises owing to the use of the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) 
payment rule for allocation of multiple land management contracts under the AVA. The second 
and major reason for allowing single bid submission is to reduce the cognitive complexity of the 
AVA. Unlike in the case of the second price auction for the sale of a single contract, where the 
winning bidder would be paid the lowest rejected bid, truth telling is more easily motivated than 
in the present case (for sale of multiple contracts). Revelation of private information about costs 
of land management may be quite difficult for the bidders given the nature of the VCG payment 
scheme under the AVA. Complexity in turn may limit the applicability of the AVA in the field 
with actual landowners.  
 
Assumption 3: There are three types of landowners on the landscape – those generating high, 
medium and low environmental benefits on their properties.  
 
The above classification however does not consider benefits from spatial contiguity – the 
ecological externality that can only be captured if neighboring properties are managed together. 
For the present study, we consider a landscape with 16 properties of which 6 are high benefit 
properties, 4 are medium benefit and the remaining 6 are low benefit generating properties. The 
value and position of the properties on the grid can be changed to give rise to different scenarios 
under which the auctions may operate.  
 Assumption 4: The landscape has three types of properties with high, low and medium 
opportunity cost of management.  
 
This assumption captures the fact that while the government may not have complete information 
about the costs of land management, some information is available on the basis of which the 
regulator can classify lands into different types.  
 
While setting up the bidding model Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoort (1997) assume that 
expectations about bid caps are distributed uniformly in the range between plus 40% and minus 
40% of the average opportunity costs of participation. In this study we relax this assumption. 
 
Assumption 5: Bidders’ expectations about the bid caps vary within a range that is inversely 
dependent on the value of opportunity costs of management.  
 
Thus lower the opportunity cost of management, wider is the range within which the expectations 
about the bid caps vary.  This assumption is based on the fact that low type landowners will 
conjecture that they have a higher chance of acceptance (since their costs are low) and hence will 
expect the range within which the bids vary to be wider compared to landowners who are of the 
high cost type. For this study, let for all properties that have a low cost of management, the 
expectations are in the range between plus 60% and minus 60% of the opportunity costs and for 
medium costs parcels it is in the range between plus 50% and minus 50% of the program costs. 
For the high cost properties we retain the assumption of the expectations varying between plus 
40% and minus 40% of the programme costs.  
 
Given the above setup, we now consider the different scenarios and the performance of existing 
scoring auctions in selecting bids for spatially contiguous land management.  
 
Section 4: Performance of conventional auctions in achieving spatial contiguity 
 
A key feature of the present study that has not be emphasized in the past studies by Rolfe et al. 
(2005) and Resson et al. (2008) is the nature of the relationships between the environmental 
benefits from land management and the opportunity costs of managing the land tracts. In the 
present study, we look at this issue in considerable detail. We consider specific cases where the 
opportunity costs of land management are negatively associated with the environmental benefit from those lands and landscapes where the association is positive. The first scenario arises in 
situations where biodiversity and habitat protection involves retirement of large tracts of land 
which are not intensively cropped from production. This is common under the CRP where 
farmers receive payments for idling cropland. An example of low benefit generating high cost 
lands are those which are highly agriculturally arable and nearer to the transportation network. 
The second scenario of high costs high benefit properties arises in situations where lands with the 
potential to generate high environmental values are locked up in commercial land uses like 
agriculture and will require considerable expenses to return to their initial conditions as well as 
lead to a high loss in income for the property owner.  
 
Given this scenario, we employ equations (7) and equation (2) to calculate the bid values and total 
environmental benefits generated from land management through the implementation of scoring 
auctions in various landscapes.  
 
Scenario I: The opportunity costs of program participation and environmental benefits generated 
from land management on the properties are negatively correlated. 
 
Under this scenario, we consider two types of landscapes – one where properties generating 
similar magnitudes of environmental benefits are situated adjacent to each other and the second 
case where they are geographically dispersed across the landscape so that same type of parcels 
may not be contiguous.  
 
In this study, all properties are arranged into a 4x4 grid with 16 cells where each cell represents 
one property on the landscape. Table 1 represent the environmental benefit from land 
management on that property and the opportunity cost of program participation.
2 All high benefit 
parcels have environmental benefits greater than 100. For medium benefit farms, the total benefit 
ranges between 50 and 100 and finally for the low benefit farms the same is under 50. Given 
assumption 4 and 5, all properties with costs between $50 and $80 are the low costs properties, 
those with costs in the range between $80 and $100 are the medium costs ones and the rest whose 
costs of land management exceed $100 are the high costs farms. For the low type properties, 
expectations for the bids range between $26 and $104, for the medium cost farms it is between 
$43.12 and $129.37 and finally for high costs properties it ranges between $67 and $156.33.  
                                                 
2 While all numerical examples are ad-hoc they are successful in demonstrating the differences in 




Opportunity costs of 
program participation 
Bid submitted  Score 
HL1  170  50  77.00  2.208(Selected) 
HL2  150  60  82.00  1.829(Selected) 
HL3  140  65  84.50  1.657(Selected) 
HL4  135  68  86.00  1.570(Selected) 
HL5  130  70  87.00  1.494 
HL6  110  77  90.50  1.215 
MM7  95  81  105.19  0.903 
MM8  80  85  107.19  0.746 
MM9  75  89  109.19  0.687 
MM10  65  90  109.69  0.593 
LH11  50  100  128.17  0.390 
LH12  45  100  128.17  0.351 
LH13  40  110  133.17  0.300 
LH14  35  115  135.67  0.258 
LH15  30  120  138.17  0.217 
LH16  25  125  140.67  0.178 
Table 1: Summary of costs, benefits, bid and score values for Scenario I 
 
 
   Figure 1a: Spatially linked core habitat      Figure 1b: Fragmented habitat 
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M10 For this example, the total budget is $350. On the basis of these figures and equation (7) the value 
of the bids that will be submitted are calculated. This is represented in Table 1 along with the 
corresponding environmental benefit-cost score on the basis of which decisions are made in these 
auctions. The benefit-cost score in this study is calculated as the ratio of environmental benefit 
and the bids submitted. It is similar to the Environmental Benefit Index that is used in the CRP 
auctions and the Biodiversity Benefit Index used in Stoneham et al. (2003). The property ID in 
the first column represents the benefit-cost type of a parcel. Thus HL3 implies the third property 
on the landscape that generates high environmental benefits and has low opportunity costs of land 
management.  
 
In the present example, the auction leads to the selection of bids from landowners 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
The total disbursal under the program is $329.50 and total environmental benefit generated is 625 
(as per Equation 2). Now if parcels of the same type are situated adjacent to each other, than the 
scoring auction leads to the creation of spatially linked habitat. This is represented by the green 
patches in Figure 1a. However if the configuration of parcels is like in Figure 1b, then the scoring 
auction leads to fragmented land management. This result leads to the following proposition.  
 
Proposition: On landscapes where costs of land management and environmental benefits are 
negatively correlated and parcels generating similar magnitudes of environmental benefits share 
common borders, conventional scoring auctions can lead to spatially contiguous habitat 
management. However absence of common borders between similar types of parcels results in 
fragmented land management. 
 
Scenario II: Costs of land management for habitat protection are positively correlated with the 
environmental benefits from land preservation and maintenance. We consider two scenarios here, 
one where similar parcels types are located adjacent to each other and another where they are not.   
 
Scenario IIa: All properties are arranged on a 16 cell grid. Table 2 below considers the case 
where all parcels with costs of management $100 and above are high cost parcels, those with 
costs between $50 and $100 are of type medium and all the remaining parcels with costs less than 
$50 are low type parcels. Given the cost figures in the above table, the interval within which 
expectations for bid caps range is between $11 and $44 for low type parcels, between $31.87 and 
$95.62 for medium type parcels and between $76 and $177.33 for high cost properties. On the basis of these figures and equation (7), the corresponding bid values and the scores for each 






Opportunity costs of 
program 
participation 
Bid submitted  Score 
HH1  170  160  168.67  1.008 
HH2  150  140  158.67  0.945 
HH3  140  125  151.17  0.926 
HH4  135  120  148.67  0.874 
HH5  130  115  146.17  0.924 
HH6  110  100  138.67  0.793 
MM7  95  90  92.81  1.024(Selected) 
MM8  80  60  77.81  1.028(Selected) 
MM9  75  55  75.31  0.996 
MM10  65  50  72.81  0.893 
LL11  50  40  42.00  1.429(Selected) 
LL12  45  35  39.50  1.392(Selected) 
LL13  40  30  37.00  1.351(Selected) 
LL14  35  25  34.50  1.304(Selected) 
LL15  30  20  32.00  0.938 
LL16  25  15  29.50  0.847 
Table 2: Summary of costs, benefits, bid and score values for Scenario IIa 
 
Scenario IIb: Table 3 below provides an example of a landscape where same type of 
environmental benefit generating properties are not be adjacent to each other except in the case of 
3 low type parcels in the lower right hand corner of the grid. In this example, all properties with 
costs of management under $50 are of the low cost type, all medium cost properties have costs 
ranging between $50 and $70 and finally all high costs properties have costs which are above 
$70. Given the cost figures in the above table, the interval within which expectations for bid caps 
range is between $13.06 and $52.26 for low type parcels, between $29.25 and $87.75 for medium 
type parcels and between $52 and $121.33 for high cost properties.  
 
Since existing conservation auctions lead to selection of bids for parcels that generate the highest 
benefit per unit of costs incurred parcels with the highest scores are accepted into the program. In 
the present situation, this leads to selection of parcel 7, 8 and 11 through 14 into the program 
under Scenario IIa and parcels 1, 3 and 5 under Scenario IIb. Total disbursal under Scenario IIa is $323.63. In Scenario IIb, the total disbursal is higher at $317. In former case the auction gives rise 
to a fragmented landscape with a suboptimal spatial configuration where all the high benefit 
parcels are excluded from the winning allocation and only low and medium benefit lands are 
managed. In the case of Scenario IIb, bids for high benefit generating parcels are accepted into 
the program but no spatially contiguous management patterns can be obtained. Under the existing 
auction set up, total environmental benefits are higher under Scenario IIb (where parcels share no 
shared borders) than under Scenario IIa (where some shared borders do exist). This indicates the 
limitations of the auction in capturing the environmental benefits of spatial contiguity. This 
scenario gives rise to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition: When costs and the environmental benefit of land management are positively 
associated, conventional scoring auctions may not lead to spatially contiguous habitat 





Two conclusions can be drawn from the examples in this section. The first is that attainment of 
specific spatial patterns in land management will require the establishment of a new auction 
mechanism that explicitly considers the issue of spatial contiguity. The second issue that arises 
from observing the information rents that are earned by all winning landowners is that given 
limited program budgets, truthful bidding and reduction in information rents is an important 
consideration that the new mechanism will have to address. In the next section we present the 
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Figure 2a: Sub-optimal spatial 
patterns & fragmented land 
management  
Figure 2b: Fragmented land 
management 
 theoretical structure of the new mechanism, the Agglomeration Vickrey Auction that addresses 







Opportunity costs of 
program participation  Bid submitted  Score 
HH1  200  110  115.67  1.729(Selected) 
HH2  150  100  110.67  1.355 
HH3  140  85  103.17  1.357(Selected) 
HH4  135  80  100.67  1.291 
HH5  130  70  98.17  1.375(Selected) 
HH6  110  66  95.67  1.150 
MM7  88  63  76.88  1.145 
MM8  80  55  75.38  1.061 
MM9  75  50  71.38  1.051 
MM10  65  45  68.88  0.944 
LL11  50  40  48.63  1.028 
LL12  45  36  46.13  0.975 
LL13  40  36  44.13  0.906 
LL14  35  30  41.13  0.851 
LL15  30  25  38.63  0.777 
LL16  25  20  36.13  0.692 
Table 3: Summary of costs, benefits, bid and score values for Scenario 2b 
 
Section 5: The Agglomeration Vickrey Auction (AVA)  
 
The main objective of the AVA is to select the efficient allocation of bids from participating 
landowners that leads to the attainment of desired spatial patterns and maximization of 
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3 The structure and performance of Target controlled and Budget controlled auctions have been separately 
studied in Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann (2007).   
Let  AVA x Î X be the combination of parcels which solves the planner’s constrained efficiency 
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AVA x i
i c i AVA AVA x V x W ) ( ) ( ) ( ˆ ) ( 0 q q                  (9) 
 
Now let  ) \ ( i x W AVA be the net social welfare (the environmental benefit less the management 
cost) of the next best allocation that would be chosen without the i
th player where  AVA x iÎ .  
 
Given these value functions, the Vickrey payments or transfers  ) ( i t q obtained by the i
th 
landowner under the AVA is given by  
 
[ ] ) \ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( i x W x W b t AVA AVA i i - + = q q                   (10) 
 
The term in the square brackets indicates the social surplus that the i
th player generates by being a 
part of the winning allocation. Then using equation (5), the utility for each landowner in the 
winning allocation is given by 
 
[ ] [ ] ) ( ) ( ) \ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 0 i c i AVA AVA i i i x W x W b u q q q q P - P - - + =   AVA x iÎ "           (11) 
 
Given the above setup of the AVA
4, we present propositions to establish the AVA as an 
individually rational and dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism.  
 
Proposition 3: The AVA is strategy-proof where truthfully bidding ones own values is a weakly 
dominant strategy  
 
                                                 
4 In order to set up the structure of the AVA, we closely follow Parkes and Kalagnanam (2002). Proof: Let us consider the i
th landowner who has been selected in the winning configuration. The 
utility of the landowner is given by (11). Here the value of the second term in the first set of 
square brackets is not affected by the bids of the i
th agent. Equation (11) can be expanded as the 
following.  
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Then using equation (5) expression (12) can be simply written as 
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In equation (13), the i
th landowner cannot influence the term in the square brackets. Now suppose 
that the agent bids an amount equal to their opportunity costs of management. In this case, 
) ( ) ( i i c G u q q - = and this expression is greater than the utility to the agent if they bid a value 
less than  ) ( i c q . Now if the agent bids above their actual costs of management, then the 
landowner has to weigh the possibilities of earning a higher VCG surplus owing to the 
submission of a higher bid or being left out of the winning outcome as the AVA chooses another 
spatial allocation that generates higher net social welfare than the present allocation to which the  
i
th landowner belongs. Given these possibilities, it is a weakly dominant strategy for the 
landowner to bid their value and earn a non-negative surplus and be in the winning allocation 
AVA x  rather being left out of it.  
 
 
 Proposition 4: The AVA is Individually Rational.  
 
Proof: The utility for the landowners in the winning combination is given by (11). From 
Proposition 3, it follows that landowners bid their true costs so that the utility to agents in 
expression (13) is given by  ) ( ) ( i i c G u q q - =  which is always non-negative. Thus participation 
in the AVA is always a dominant strategy "i Î F.  
 
Section 6: Spatially coordinated land management under the AVA 
 
Given the above theoretical setup of the AVA, we now consider a numerical example to establish 
the effectiveness of the same in achieving specific spatial patterns in land management. In the 
first step, we present a brief description of the nature of the spatial patterns that we will consider 
for our example. It is to be noted that the configuration of parcel types on the landscape 
determines the type of spatial patterns that are to be created through selection of bids. In order to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the AVA, we consider Scenario 2a where the nature of the 
landscape is such that similar types of parcels are situated adjacent to each other. The 
implementation of the scoring auction on this landscape leads to the selection of 2 medium 
benefit generating and 4 low benefit generating parcels. This gives rise to a sub-optimal spatial 
pattern where 3 low and 2 medium environmental benefit generating parcels are linked together. 
However fragmentation exists as the one remaining low type parcel that is selected does not share 
a common border with any of the other parcels.  
 
Section 6.1: Types of spatial patterns  
 
Different types of habitat reserves can be considered for the purpose of conservation. One of the 
most common ways in which such a goal can be achieved is through the creation of a habitat core 
reserve for species preservation. This involves management in and around large areas of land to 
create a zone that is relatively undisturbed by external anthropocentric and non-anthropocentric 
factors. Such reserves lead to easy proliferation and dispersal of different species improving their 
chances of survival. Examples of endangered species that thrive in core habitat reserves are red 
cockaded woodpecker, grizzly bear and northern spotted owl (Parkhurst and Shogren 2007). 
Another common spatial configuration involves the creation of corridors linking habitat cores 
(primary habitat patches) for improved movement of species across the landscape. Such corridors 
reduce the chances of isolation of reserves from each other especially for species which have very high mobility. Animals like wolves and elks survive well in such corridor reserves (Parkhurst and 
Shogren 2007).  
 
For the purpose of illustration of the performance of the AVA, given the nature of configuration 
of high, medium and low type parcels on the landscape represented in Figure 2a, we consider 5 
different possibilities for spatial patterns as represented in Figure 3 below. The objective of the 









Figure 3a represents the core area of habitat where four high benefit properties are selected into 
the program with the parcels sharing 4 borders. Figure 3b is an East West (EW) corridor – Type 1 
project where three high benefit parcels are managed together, sharing 2 borders. In Figure 3c, we 
get a North-South (NS) Corridor – Type 1 where two low benefit parcels and two high benefit 
properties are accepted into the program. Here there is a common border between the two high 
type properties and one each between the low and high type parcel. In Figure 3d, NS corridor – 
Type 2 is considered that is created through management of all medium type parcels. Here there 
are 3 shared borders between all the three parcels. Finally in the East West Corridor – Type 2, 
three low type parcels are chosen with two shared borders existing between them.  
 
Section 6.2: Performance of the Agglomeration Vickrey Auction 
 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the AVA, in achieving spatial patterns, we carry over 
the numerical example in Scenario IIa to this section. Since the AVA explicitly considers the 


























Figure 3: Spatial patterns considered for landscape in Scenario 2a diagonal elements of matrix Ñ. Let the total environmental benefit from one shared border 
between two parcels of the high type be given by 60. For every border that a low type parcel 
shares with a high type parcel, the total benefit generated is 40 and for a shared border between 
the high and medium benefit generating parcels, the total benefit is 50. 
 









welfare –  ) (x W  
Core-1  HH1, HH2, HH4, HH5  825  535  290 
Core-2  HH2, HH3, HH5, HH6  775  480  295 
NS Corridor- 
Type1-1  HH1, LL11, HH4, LL14  545  345  200 
EW Corridor-
Type2-1  LL14, LL15, LL16  160  60  100 
NS Corridor- 
Type1-2  HH2, LL12, HH5, LL15  520  310  210 
NS Corridor- 
Type1-3  HH3, LL13, HH6, LL16  475  270  205 
EW Corridor-
Type2-2  LL11, LL12, LL13  205  105  100 
EW Corridor-
Type1-1  HH1, HH2, HH3  580  425  155 
EW Corridor-
Type1-2  HH4, HH5, HH6  495  335  160 
NS Corridor- 
Type2 
MM7, MM8,  
MM9, MM10  450  255  195 
 
 
Considering a shared border between two medium type properties, the total environmental benefit 
is 45. When two neighboring properties of type medium and low are managed, the benefit from 
the shared border is 32. The lowest benefit from land management is from the management of 
two low type parcels. This value is at 20. On the basis of these figures, the total environmental 
benefit from the various configurations listed in Section 6.1 is represented in Table 4 above. The 
number of shared borders for each configuration can be observed in Figure 3. We retain the same 
value of the budget at $350. The cost of supporting a particular allocation is obtained as the sum 
of the submitted bids that represent the actual opportunity costs of land management (as per 
Proposition 3).  
 
Given, the net social welfare from every configuration that is represented in the last column of 
Table 4, the highest environmental benefit is generated from the achievement of Core-Type 1 
Table 4: Outcomes of the AVA for Scenario IIa: Environmental benefits, costs & social welfare 
 habitat. This is followed by NS Type 1 corridors and NS Type 2 corridor. Now on the basis of 
Proposition 3 and equation (10), Table 5 represents the VCG transfers that are to be made to 
landowners in order to support the top three environmental benefit generating spatial 
configurations – those configurations that generate the highest net social welfare for both the 
social planner and the landowners. Table 5 indicates that while core habitat configurations 
generate very high benefits, they cannot be supported by the limited budget. As a result, bids for 
the combination of properties constituting the NS Corridor Type1-2 are selected under the AVA. 
The total value of transfers made to support this allocation is $330.  
 
Spatial configuration  Net social welfare  Parcels in configuration  Transfers  Total 
HH2  230 
HH3  130 
HH5  205 
Core-2  295 
HH6  105 
670 
HH1  240 
HH2  225 
HH4  200 
Core-1  290 
HH5  200 
865 
HH2  145 
HH5  120 
LL12  40 
NS Corridor 
Type1-2  210 
LL15  25 
330 
Table 5: Net social benefit & transfers for top 3 allocations 
 
Section 6.3: The Agglomeration Vickrey Auction and Scoring Auctions: A 
comparative analysis 
 
In this section we present a comparative analysis of the results of the AVA and the scoring 
auction. We demonstrate that for the landscape represented in Scenario IIa, implementation of the 
AVA leads to higher environmental benefits than when the scoring auction is implemented on the 
landscape. Figure 4 below represents the configurations of managed parcels under both the 
auctions.  
 Under the assumption that the environmental benefit function  ) ( ˆ x V is additive in nature with the 
total benefit from a configuration equal to the sum of individual benefits, the total environmental 
benefit from the allocation in Figure 4a is 385
5. The total disbursal is $323.63 and the sum of 
opportunity costs of land management is 280. Thus the net social welfare is given by 105. For the 
allocation in Figure 4b, the total disbursal as given in Table 5 is 330 and the total environmental 
benefit generated is 520. The total opportunity cost of land management for this allocation is 
$310 implying that the net social welfare is 210. Thus through the implementation of the AVA, 
the resultant allocation generates a higher environmental benefit. This higher benefit is owing to 
spatially contiguous habitat management. Also, the total environmental benefit generated from 
the allocation in Figure 4a when the spatial benefits of the shared borders (those between medium 
type parcels and between low type parcels) are considered is 502. Thus the total environmental 
benefit from NS Corridor Type1-2 is higher than the ad-hoc sub-optimal – semi fragmented 
configuration obtained under the scoring auction. Thus given a limited budget, for a landscape 
where both the AVA and scoring auctions maybe implemented, the AVA leads to higher 







                                                 
5 In this case, Ñ is the null matrix with all elements equal to zero as the auction does not explicitly consider 
benefits from spatial contiguity.  
L14  L15  L16 
H1 
H6  H5  H4  M9 
M10 
H2  H3  M8 
M7  L11  L12  L13 
L14  L15  L16 
H1 
H6  H5  H4  M9 
M10 
H2  H3  M8 
M7  L11  L12  L13 
Figure 4a: Configuration 
under Scoring Auction 
Figure 4b: Configuration under 
AVA 
 Section 7: Final remarks  
 
The present study demonstrates that when ecological criteria like spatially contiguity between 
managed habitats are necessary to maximize the conservation potential of limited program 
budgets, existing scoring auctions like the CRP may not be efficient in many landscapes. Such 
landscapes are those where lands with similar features conducive to conservation are not situated 
adjacent to each other or where there exists a positive association between environmental benefits 
generated and the total private opportunity cost of generating these benefits. In these situations, a 
new mechanism, the AVA is to be employed to achieve the environmental value maximizing 
goals through creation of specific spatial patterns.  
 
The theoretical structure of the AVA is simple in order to make it easily understandable when 
employed with actual stakeholders. However complexity – cognitive and computational is a 
concern. Collusive bidding is another problem that may be encountered in the implementation of 
these auctions (Reeson et al. 2008) in general. Collusive tendencies arise when landowners 
situated at strategic positions on the landscape submit bids in excess of their costs of land 
management. Collusion will reduce the cost efficiency of auction. This might be problem in the 
present setting given that the second price auction has been proven to be more susceptible to 
collusion than the first-price auction both in a single round and repeated settings (Robinson 1985, 
Milgrom 1987).  
 
On the basis of the above scenario, the theoretical structure of AVA has to be supported by 
experimental research to test various hypotheses about the proposed mechanism. The AVA will 
be tested in laboratory settings to determine whether the cognitive complexity of the auction for 
bidders reduces the performance and efficiency of the mechanism, and whether collusion occurs 
and results in suboptimal allocations reduction of cost efficiency. We also intend to conduct 
experiments to analyze bidder behavior under specific situations. These involve sessions where 
the bidders are informed about the spatial objective and others where they are not, and second 
sessions where the subjects participate in multi-round auctions that allow revision of bids 
submitted vis-à-vis sessions where this is not allowed. The first treatment is necessary to assess 
the trade-offs between revealing information to abet coordinated land management as opposed to 
suppressing the same to reduce collusive bidding. Results of these sessions will have bearing on 
the ultimate cost-efficiency of the AVA. The second treatment is necessary in order to assess whether revision of bids and the option to correct past mistakes improves auction performance. 
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